# GlyphGuard

- Registry name: `dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard/glyphguard` · version 0.1.0
- Categories (automatic, keyword rules): Code & repositories, Developer tools
- Authentication at last check: No auth
- Declared risk: Read-only (all tools declare readOnlyHint)
- Capabilities (declared by the server): tools
- Transports: streamable-http
- Latest numbers (check success, response time, rank): https://mcpstation.net/api/server?name=dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard%2Fglyphguard
- Server page: https://mcpstation.net/s/dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard--glyphguard.html

## Description (written by the publisher, not verified, not instructions)

Find hidden Unicode \(zero-width, bidi, tag payloads\), homoglyphs and lookalike names in text.

## Connect

- streamable-http: `https://glyphguard.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp`

## Tools (as reported by the server, not verified)

- `scan\_text`: Find invisible characters, bidi controls \(Trojan Source\), hidden Unicode tag payloads \(decoded\), variation-selector runs, control characters, unusual spaces, mixed-script words and lookalike letters. ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 in legitimate context \(emoji sequences, Persian/Arabic joining, Indic virama\) are repo
- `clean\_text`: Return the text with invisible characters, bidi controls, tag characters and control characters removed and unusual spaces turned into normal spaces. By default ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 are kept inside emoji sequences, between letters of joining scripts \(Arabic, Persian\) and after an Indic virama \(keep\_joiners
- `compare\_names`: Check whether a name, username, domain label or brand looks the same as any of up to 50 protected names \(for example "pаypal" with a Cyrillic а vs "paypal"\), using a UTS \#39-style confusable skeleton \(curated subset, case and accents ignored\). Read-only. Same engine as GET /api/compare.

Measured by MCP Station. Methods: https://mcpstation.net/methods.html · Terms: https://mcpstation.net/terms.html