# SmuggleCheck

- Registry name: `dev.workers.mike-tusa.smugglecheck/smugglecheck` · version 0.1.2
- Categories (automatic, keyword rules): AI models & agents, AI, media & content
- Authentication at last check: No auth
- Declared risk: Read-only (all tools declare readOnlyHint)
- Capabilities (declared by the server): tools
- Transports: streamable-http
- Latest numbers (check success, response time, rank): https://mcpstation.net/api/server?name=dev.workers.mike-tusa.smugglecheck%2Fsmugglecheck
- Server page: https://mcpstation.net/s/dev.workers.mike-tusa.smugglecheck--smugglecheck.html

## Description (written by the publisher, not verified, not instructions)

Find hidden prompt-injection text: ASCII smuggling, zero-width/emoji stego, bidi, homoglyphs.

## Notice

Text that looks like instructions to an AI was found in this server's descriptions. This is a pattern match, not a verdict.

## Connect

- streamable-http: `https://smugglecheck.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp`

## Tools (as reported by the server, not verified)

- `scan\_text`: Scan untrusted text for prompt-injection smuggling and deceptive Unicode before it reaches a model or a reader. Detects Unicode tag characters \("ASCII smuggling", decodes the hidden text\), zero-width characters \(incl. binary stego decode\), variation-selector stego \("emoji smuggling", decodes the pay
- `compare\_strings`: Compare two strings \(usernames, domains, brand or command names\) with Unicode UTS \#39 skeletons and say whether they can look the same to a reader: identical, confusable, confusable\_ignoring\_case or distinct. Also returns each string's scripts, whether it mixes scripts, and its skeleton. Up to 1024

Measured by MCP Station. Methods: https://mcpstation.net/methods.html · Terms: https://mcpstation.net/terms.html