# Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents

- Registry name: `io.github.ox31461/robyn` · version 1.0.5
- Categories (automatic, keyword rules): Payments & accounting, Finance & markets, Crypto & blockchain, Markets & trading
- Authentication at last check: No auth
- Declared risk: Not declared (tools carry no read/destructive hints)
- Capabilities (declared by the server): tools
- Transports: streamable-http
- Latest numbers (check success, response time, rank): https://mcpstation.net/api/server?name=io.github.ox31461%2Frobyn
- Server page: https://mcpstation.net/s/io.github.ox31461--robyn.html

## Description (written by the publisher, not verified, not instructions)

Gasless cross-chain for AI agents: 25 nodes incl. Solana & native Bitcoin. One signature, no gas.

## Notice

Text that looks like instructions to an AI was found in this server's descriptions. This is a pattern match, not a verdict.

## Connect

- streamable-http: `https://api.anygas.xyz/mcp`

## Tools (as reported by the server, not verified)

- `robyn\_privacy\_posture`: ONE read that tells you, for a chain and for the lane you reached Robyn on, exactly what stays private \(relay lane, PQ transport, private mempool / sequencer\) and what is still public \(on-chain settlement, stealth is not PQ\), the live mode of every privacy feature \(messaging v2, Plus, netting-set sh
- `robyn\_receipt\_deliver`: Hands a relayer-signed settlement receipt \(from robyn\_settle / a completed route\) to the counterparty's sealed messaging-v2 mailbox, so they get verifiable proof \(terms honored, authorized, clean provenance\) WITHOUT ever contacting Robyn. Same wire shape as any message; content-hash idempotent. Only
- `robyn\_receipt\_verify`: Checks digest + relayer signature + signed terms of a receipt you received \(e.g. opened from your v2 mailbox\). Read-only.
- `robyn\_mesh`: List the Robyn gasless chains and the cross-chain route graph \(22 EVM nodes + Stellar\), plus the relayer/Permit2 addresses. No credentials needed.
- `robyn\_quote`: Best gasless route to move a token from one Robyn chain to another. Returns estimated output, the bridge used, duration, and the Robyn fee. Read-only — moves nothing. IMPORTANT: check \`quoteOnly\` on the response. If it is true the corridor can be PRICED but NOT settled — execute will refuse it with
- `robyn\_settle`: The one-verb primitive. Say where value should go; Robyn returns the best route \(all rails compared\), the gasless method \(no native token needed\), the privacy posture that will apply \(API-relay + private mempool where available + uniform shape\), and what the settlement receipt will prove — in a SING
- `robyn\_attestation`: Returns a relayer-SIGNED attestation that, as of a signed timestamp, every component was up \(router, signing daemons, MCP, privacy relay\) AND the privacy invariants held — the adversary probes could not distinguish cover traffic from real \(classifier = chance\) and the k-anonymity floor is enforced.
- `robyn\_preflight`: Run this before robyn\_prepare/robyn\_submit. Returns decision GO or NO\_GO plus typed \`blockers\` \(each with a \`fix\`\) and \`warnings\`. It catches, for free, the failures that otherwise cost gas: a fixed corridor fee that would consume the whole amount so nothing arrives, a recipient in the wrong address
- `robyn\_vip\_status`: Check whether an address holds a recognised member NFT and what it gets. Members pay ZERO on cross-chain transfers of $0.10-$25 to low-cost chains, 15bps instead of 25bps routing, and 10% instead of 25% gas markup. Read-only. Call this before quoting for a user so you can tell them accurately what a
- `robyn\_route\_status`: Status of an in-flight route by id \(BRIDGING → DONE\), with the destination tx once delivered.
- `robyn\_cross\_chain`: Plan a gasless cross-chain move and get the exact payload to sign. This hosted server never holds your key: call this, sign what it returns with your own wallet, then call robyn\_submit to have the relayer broadcast it and pay the gas.
- `robyn\_prepare`: Turn a plain-language or structured intent into a concrete plan plus the EXACT payload to sign. Costs nothing, moves nothing, needs no key. Returns status:"sign" with signRequest, or status:"quoted" if something is still missing.
- `robyn\_sandbox\_do`: Runs the identical path end to end against the sandbox: no key, no funds, no broadcast. Use this to prove an integration works before touching real money.
- `robyn\_submit`: Relay an intent you already signed. The relayer broadcasts it and fronts all network gas; your account needs no native token. Build \`permit2\` from robyn\_prepare: sign its signRequest.eip712 payload \(canonical Permit2 domain + PermitTransferFrom/TokenPermissions types\) and pass the OBJECT below - not
- `robyn\_netting\_info`: Explains the opt-in netting ledger: transfers between two ENROLLED accounts settle as a book entry — no chain, no gas, no fee, instant, at ANY size including amounts below every per-chain cost floor. CUSTODIAL — this is the ONE part of Robyn that holds your balance; every other tool here moves funds
- `robyn\_netting\_account`: Whether an address is enrolled \(and therefore custodied\), its internal balance, recent history, and \`nextNonce\` — which you MUST use when signing the next transfer or withdrawal. An address that never enrolled is reported as not custodied. Read-only.
- `robyn\_netting\_preview`: Free and read-only. Given an amount, ranks EVERY exit chain by what actually arrives after the destination payout cost is deducted. Those costs differ by more than 1000x \(Avalanche delivers \~$0.99994 of a dollar; Linea \~$0.927\), so which chain you leave on is a real decision. Pass toChain to price o
- `robyn\_netting\_statement`: Internal transfers produce NO transaction hash because no transaction occurs — this append-only journal is their only record. Never truncated; page with \`before\` \(a seq number\). Use this when a user asks to verify or dispute an internal payment, since there is no chain to check.
- `robyn\_netting\_reserves`: Publishes what Robyn OWES across all netting accounts against the real relayer float backing it, per chain. Solvency is checkable rather than asserted. Deposits are refused if they would push liabilities above a safe share of the float. Read-only — a user considering a custodial balance should be sh
- `robyn\_netting\_enroll\_payload`: Returns the EXACT message the account must sign with its OWN key to open a custodial balance. This endpoint holds no key and enrols nobody — it returns the text; the user signs it, then POST \{address, signature\} to /api/netting/enroll. CUSTODIAL — this is the ONE part of Robyn that holds your balanc
- `robyn\_netting\_transfer\_payload`: Returns the exact string to sign, with the correct next nonce, for a free instant transfer between two ENROLLED accounts. Signs nothing and moves nothing — the sender signs the returned message, then POSTs \{from,to,amount,nonce,signature\} to /api/netting/transfer. BOTH parties must already be enroll
- `robyn\_counterparty\_check`: Your OWN payment history with a recipient address: how many times, how recently, and whether this amount is typical. Call it before paying an address you have not confirmed. THIS IS NOT A REPUTATION SCORE and says nothing about whether the address is honest. A familiar address is NOT a safe address
- `robyn\_preflight\_full`: ONE call combining serviceability, routing competitiveness, cheaper alternatives, delivery basis and mandate budget into a single go/no-go. Call this before executing rather than making five separate checks. BLOCKERS AND WARNINGS ARE DIFFERENT. \`blockers\` WILL fail — do not attempt the transfer. \`wa
- `robyn\_integration\_lint`: Post the request you INTEND to make and get back what is missing or unsafe, with the concrete consequence. Run this before your first live execute. Findings marked \`unsafe\` can lose money or make you report something untrue — fix them, do not proceed. IMPORTANT: it lints the REQUEST only. A clean li
- `robyn\_recipes`: Ordered playbooks for real goals: pay-someone-safely, prove-what-i-spent, spend-within-a-budget, handle-failures-well, stay-current. CALL THIS BEFORE IMPROVISING A SEQUENCE. Each step says what it answers, what to do with the answer, whether it is optional, and what skipping it costs. Steps marked o
- `robyn\_changelog`: Machine-readable API history. Pass the version your integration was built against as \`since\` and you get only what has changed after it, with an explicit \`breaking\` flag on each entry. CHECK \`mustAct\` FIRST: if true there are breaking changes and an existing integration may ALREADY be failing — read
- `robyn\_errors`: The full error taxonomy: every errorCode, whether it is retryable, and the suggested recovery action. Read this once and branch on errorCode instead of parsing messages.
- `robyn\_verify\_outcome`: Check what ACTUALLY happened to a settled transfer, against the destination chain rather than Robyn's own database. Optionally assert who should have been paid \(\`recipient\`\) and the minimum that should have arrived \(\`minAmount\`\); we decode the payout transaction's ERC-20 Transfer logs and report whe
- `robyn\_plan`: Validate a WHOLE multi-step workflow up front instead of one hop at a time. Fees and durations accumulate across steps. Evaluation stops at the first unroutable step rather than reporting speculative results behind it. If the plan cannot work, the response names the BINDING CONSTRAINT and the value
- `robyn\_spend\_statement`: A statement of every transfer in a window with each fee broken down, SIGNED by Robyn's relayer key \(EIP-191\). Use this when you must PROVE to a principal what you spent — your own summary is a claim by the party being audited, but this is verifiable against a published address without trusting you o
- `robyn\_fee\_forensics`: Reconstruct a settled transfer unit by unit: destination payout gas, Robyn margin, or a Robyn SUBSIDY where Robyn absorbed a loss. Each line names who was paid and how the figure was derived. Anything that cannot be attributed is returned as \`unattributed\` rather than folded into another line — if y
- `robyn\_delivery\_stats`: How long settlements ACTUALLY take, per rail and per corridor — not a single advertised constant. CHECK \`basis\`/\`status\`: below the sample threshold this returns \`insufficient-data\` and the figure is a static ESTIMATE, not a measurement. Say which you are quoting when you tell a user how long someth
- `robyn\_mandate\_events`: Poll for spend, nearly-exhausted, exhausted, approval-required and revoked events on a principal's mandates. Pass the returned \`cursor\` back as \`since\` for only what is new. Use this to tell a principal their budget is running low or that a large payment is waiting on their approval, instead of maki
- `robyn\_mandate\_list`: List all mandates granted by a principal address, with remaining budget, co-sign threshold, expiry and revocation state. Use this before telling a user they are safe: live mandates can still be drawn against WITHOUT further approval, and a forgotten grant is the one that hurts. Anything they no long
- `robyn\_mandate\_cosign\_request`: For mandates with a co-sign threshold, check whether a specific spend needs the principal to approve it and get the exact digest they must sign. The digest binds the mandate, the transfer AND the amount, so an approval cannot be reused for a different payment — do not attempt to reuse one. If a larg
- `robyn\_mandate\_certificate`: A signed certificate listing every spend counted against a mandate, the budget, the total spent, and whether it stayed inside. Hand it to the principal at the end of a period. Every spend listed was VERIFIED ON-CHAIN before counting, and the amount is what the chain showed arrived — not what the age
- `robyn\_mandate\_check`: Check a proposed spend against a signed spending mandate BEFORE making it. Returns WITHIN\_MANDATE, EXCEEDS\_MANDATE or EXPIRED plus the remaining budget. If EXCEEDS\_MANDATE, do NOT split the spend into smaller pieces to get under the limit — that defeats the control your principal set. Ask them to ra
- `robyn\_mandate\_status`: Remaining and consumed budget for a signed mandate. Consumption counts ONLY transfers verified on-chain, so the figure cannot be inflated by claiming spends that did not happen.
- `robyn\_improve\_cost`: Turns a price into a decision. Returns concrete, QUANTIFIED changes — a cheaper destination chain with the exact saving, the size at which a fixed payout cost stops dominating, whether the instant float lane applies, and whether rails that would have competed were unavailable. CRITICAL: suggestions
- `robyn\_why\_this\_route`: Returns the full routing decision: every rail that quoted, what each would deliver, the margin the winner won by, and which rails stayed SILENT and why. Signed, so you can archive the rationale. CHECK \`wasCompetitive\` BEFORE TELLING A USER THE PRICE IS GOOD. If it is false, exactly one rail answered
- `robyn\_capability\_snapshot`: A signed, timestamped record of current capability: which chains can actually be PAID OUT ON right now, which are merely policy-eligible, which rails are execute-ready, and whether delivery figures are measured or estimated. USE \`serviceableNow\`, NOT \`policyEligible\`, when deciding where to send fun
- `robyn\_evidence\_bundle`: Assembles EVERYTHING about a settled transfer in one call: the on-chain verification, the unit-by-unit fee breakdown, what the alternative route would have cost, and whether the delivery time is measured or estimated — signed as a whole. This is the artefact to hand to a principal who was not there;
- `robyn\_payment\_request\_prepare`: Build a canonical payment request \(payee, chain, token, amount, memo, expiry\) and return the digest for THE PAYEE to sign with their own wallet. Robyn does not sign these and holds no payee keys — a request signed by Robyn would prove nothing about the payee. Use this when an agent needs to ASK anot
- `robyn\_payment\_request\_verify`: ALWAYS run this before paying a request you received. It confirms the payee address, chain, token and amount were signed by whoever controls the payee address, and that the request has not expired. If \`signedByPayee\` is false, DO NOT PAY — that is what an altered payee address looks like, and addres
- `robyn\_payment\_request\_settlement`: After paying, prove it: re-checks the transfer against the DESTINATION CHAIN and confirms the payee was paid at least the amount requested. Returns paid=true only on a verified on-chain result; paid=null means undetermined, which is NOT evidence you satisfied the request.
- `robyn\_refusal\_verify`: Check a signed refusal receipt. Send header \`x-anygas-receipt: 1\` on any request and, IF Robyn refuses it, the error response carries a signed \`refusalReceipt\` recording what was asked, when, and why. This matters because when a provider says no, the AGENT gets the blame — a receipt lets you prove t
- `robyn\_7702\_delegate`: The canonical Robyn EIP-7702 batch-executor delegate: its address on each of the 22 EVM chains, the ABI, and the EIP-712 scheme for executeSigned. Delegate to this and the relayer can sponsor your transactions. Read-only.
- `robyn\_7702\_check`: Check that a signed EIP-7702 authorization tuple recovers the expected account, and whether its nonce matches the live account nonce. Free, read-only, moves nothing.
- `robyn\_sponsor\_7702`: Price or request an EIP-7702 sponsored transaction: Robyn submits your signed authorization as a type-4 transaction and PAYS THE GAS, so your account needs no native token. Over this HOSTED endpoint the call is a DRY price-check \(returns estGas, priceUsd and the exact envelope\) — paying the x402 inv
- `robyn\_yield\_account`: An agent's own Aave v3 / Moonwell position \(aUSDC/mUSDC\) per chain + the capped allowance it granted the relayer + live APY \(best-yield auto-selected\). Non-custodial: funds stay in the agent's wallet, Robyn holds no key and no pool.
- `robyn\_yield\_quote`: Read-only JIT quote: how a spend would be fulfilled from an agent's Aave yield venue \(draw \<= your allowance -\> Aave/Moonwell withdraw -\> gasless deliver\). Moves nothing.
- `robyn\_yield\_spend`: Spend from your yield \(Aave v3 or Moonwell\) with ONE EIP-712 signature: Robyn pulls only up to your on-chain aUSDC/mUSDC allowance, unwinds exactly what is needed, and delivers gaslessly; the remainder keeps earning. This HOSTED endpoint is READ-ONLY: it returns the exact EIP-712 intent to sign + a
- `robyn\_message\_info`: Sonar — PRIVATE · SEALED · POST-QUANTUM MESSENGER \(broadcast to everyone, understood by one, remembered by none\). Hybrid ML-KEM-768+X25519 encryption, a one-time stealth handle per message, fixed-size ciphertexts, 60 s release grid. The server stores only \(ephemeralPubKey, viewTag, ct\) — no sender,
- `robyn\_message\_directory`: Every published v2 mailbox. PUBLIC rows carry \{address, metaAddress, kemPub\}; PRIVATE rows \(the default since 2026-08-28\) carry \{handle, metaAddress, kemPub\} and deliberately NO address. Identical for every reader, so fetching it reveals nothing about whom you intend to message — pick the recipient
- `robyn\_message\_mailbox\_of`: For a Robyn name or NULL handle the server must resolve it, so this reveals your intended recipient to the server — prefer robyn\_message\_directory when you have an address. Returns \{address\|handle, metaAddress, kemPub\} \(private-handle rows carry no address by design\). Read-only.
- `robyn\_message\_send`: Relays a message you sealed locally with /svc/msg2-sdk.mjs \(seal\(mailbox, inner\) → \{ephemeralPubKey, viewTag, ct\}\). This tool cannot encrypt for you: sending plaintext here would expose it to the relay, so it only accepts the sealed triple. Replay-idempotent \(a resend returns duplicate:true\). The me
- `robyn\_message\_feed`: Returns released rows \{id, ephemeralPubKey, viewTag, ct, releaseAt, nextAfter\}, identical for every reader. Scan locally with the SDK \(inbox\(identity\)\) — checkStealthAddress with your viewPriv, then open ct with your KEM secret. Page with after=\<nextAfter\> \(exact compound cursor — never skips same-t
- `robyn\_message\_publish\_mailbox`: Registers a mailbox so others can seal to you. PRIVATE BY DEFAULT: the server stores only a salted hash of your signing address — pass \`handle\` to be reachable by name \(agents get the same handle claim browsers have\), or \`public:true\` to bind your bare 0x address in the open directory instead. Gener
- `robyn\_plus\_info`: Plus sells capacity \(rate-limit-exempt sends\), funded cover rows and signed/anchored Merkle proofs — never a "more private lane" \(that would be a smaller crowd\). Paid in ETH \(Robinhood Chain, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base\), USDC \(Base, Arbitrum\) or BTC \(Chainflip\). Redeemed with RFC 9474 blind passes the
- `robyn\_plus\_invoice`: Creates an invoice for one bundle \(500 passes, $3 quoted in the chosen asset\). Returns \{invoiceId, payTo, amount \(base units\), human, chainId, expires\}. Pay from any wallet; then blind tokens locally with the SDK and call robyn\_plus\_claim. For btc pass refundAddress \(your BTC address\) — the invoice
- `robyn\_plus\_invoice\_status`: Status, remaining passes and payment details for an invoice. Read-only.
- `robyn\_plus\_trial`: Try Plus before paying: submit up to 20 BLINDED tokens \(base64, from plus-sdk blindTokens\(\)\) and receive blind signatures — identical BLINDED passes to paid ones \(the server never sees a pass; unlinkable to the claim only once the Plus mint key is pinned in the witness-chained head, K3, and only to
- `robyn\_plus\_claim`: Submit BLINDED tokens \(base64, from plus-sdk blindTokens\(\)\) with the payment txHash. Payment is verified on-chain \(recipient, amount, confirmation; one tx pays one invoice\), then each blinded token is signed blind. Unblind locally \(plus-sdk claim\(\) does all of this\). This tool never sees an unblinde
- `robyn\_message\_anchor\_proof`: Merkle inclusion proof for an anchored row id: leaf, path, root, the signer’s EIP-191 signature over the batch statement and the on-chain tx when enabled. Verify locally with plus-sdk verifyAnchorProof\(\). Read-only.
- `robyn\_message\_erasure`: The last purge statement \(expired count, cumulative, root of purged ids\) signed by the operator. Read-only.
- `null\_ecosystem`: The live NULL manifest: every product \(messenger, Pay, Vault, Drop, Legacy, Agent Wire, forward secrecy\), its status, its page, the wired/proposed integrations between them, the security spine, and the concept pipeline. This is the same single source of truth the owner console and the human Suite re
- `null\_names\_quote`: Quotes a handle: 3ch $512/yr, 4ch $128/yr, 5-6ch $4/yr \(deliberately under ENS\), 7+ characters FREE forever. Includes live state \(available/registered/grace/premium with the 21-day Dutch decay\) and the exact register-\>pay-\>claim steps. Names are public by definition - quoting one reveals nothing.
- `null\_names\_market`: Live listings of premium handles for sale, plus the full deal protocol: agree peer-to-peer in a sealed chat, pay stealth or via NULL Escrow 2-of-3, then finalize with the dual-signed \(secp + ML-DSA\) witness-chained transfer and a 2% \($1 min\) fee receipt. Listing your own handle: sign null-name-list/
- `null\_prekeys\_fetch`: Fetches \{spk, sigSpk, otk, otksLeft\} for a recipient so you can start an X3DH-PQ forward-secret session \(SDK: fs.startOutbound\). ALWAYS fetch by META-ADDRESS: the sigSpk check verifies against the meta-address spendPub \(sha256\("null-fs-spk/v1:"+spk\), secp256k1\) and CANNOT run on a handle fetch \(the
- `null\_prekeys\_publish`: Makes you reachable with forward secrecy: publishes your signed prekey bundle \(medium-term spk + one-time otks\) so peers can start X3DH-PQ sessions TO you. Generate and sign locally with the SDK \(fs.genBundle + publishPrekeys — sigSpk is secp256k1 over sha256\("null-fs-spk/v1:"+spk\) by your spend key
- `null\_balance`: Reads an address balance through the NULL server-side RPC proxy, so YOUR IP never reaches any public RPC provider \(this host queries upstream from its own address\). BE HONEST ABOUT THE TRADE: querying a stealth address you derived LINKS that address, your session, and the time of interest AT THIS RE
- `null\_notarize`: Proof-of-existence: hash the document LOCALLY \(sha256, 64 hex\) and send only the hash. The issuer countersigns \{h, ts\} with ML-DSA-65 \(post-quantum\); ts is SERVER-assigned. Optional owner endorsement: ownerAddr + ownerSig = EIP-191 over "null-notary/owner/v1\|\<h\>"; if you add ownerMeta and that ident
- `null\_prov\_issuer`: Returns the post-quantum issuer public key that countersigns notary attestations, provenance mints and the witness-log head. Pin it once and verify everything against the pinned copy - a proof should never carry the key it wants to be checked against. Public on every lane.
- `null\_prov\_mint`: Relays a provenance request you signed LOCALLY \(SDK mintProvenance builds it\): \{meta, claim, ts, sig, bind, sig2\}. A post-quantum identity MUST include sig2 \(ML-DSA\) or the issuer refuses. The issuer checks your signature + identity binding and countersigns - the claim is REGISTERED, not endorsed. t
- `null\_login\_verify`: Stateless dual-signature check \(secp256k1 + ML-DSA-65\) of a NULLAUTH1 assertion for YOUR rp domain and the ONE-TIME challenge YOU issued; returns \{ok, psid, mode, named, meta, handle\(claim\)\}. Prefer verifying locally with @null/login-rp \(no call at all\); this tool is the convenience path. rp + chall
- `null\_witness\_head`: ML-DSA-signed head \{seq, root, sig\} of the append-only log that binds every mailbox record \(slot\|meta\|kemPub\|ts\). Signed by the SAME issuer key as null\_prov\_issuer. Keep the last head you saw; a later head must extend it \(null\_witness\_range\) - a fork is proof of equivocation. Public on every lane so
- `null\_witness\_range`: Up to 20 entries \{s, b, r, t\} from seq \`from\`: b binds slot\|meta\|kemPub\|ts, r = sha256\(prevRoot + b\). Replay the chain from a head you trust to prove a mailbox binding was never silently swapped. Public on every lane.
- `null\_transparency`: The signed sha256 of every crypto artifact the server hands out \(SDK, bundle, workers\); hash changes are witness-chained under release:\<file\>. Fetch an artifact, hash it, compare - a mismatch means you were served something that is not the signed release.
- `null\_capsule\_cancel`: Destroys a future-dated capsule you sent with \{holdMs, cancellable:true\}, using its one-time cancel token. Already-released rows are untouchable. The token proves nothing about who you are. Private-lane-only: use the stdio door.
- `null\_calls\_info`: What the blind call relay offers \(1:1 and conference, codecs, join-token model\). Media keys are sealed through the feed and never reach the relay. Calls themselves need a media-capable client \(browser\); agents can read the posture and hand a human the join flow.
- `null\_void\_descriptor`: Returns a pseudonymous channel descriptor \{descriptor, witness:\{ts\}\}; the 3.3 KB ML-DSA signature and the handle-ownership proof come as separate parts \(part=sig \| part=proof\) because they cannot share one 8 KiB lane reply. Verify all three locally \(SDK voidVerifyDescriptor\) before following. Privat
- `null\_void\_directory`: Channels whose creators SIGNED themselves discoverable \(dark by default\). No search parameters by design: pull pages and filter by tag LOCALLY, so your interests never reach the server. Opaque cursor, neutral order, no counts. Returns 404 if the directory is not switched on in this deployment, and P
- `null\_void\_publish`: Relays \{descriptor, proof:\{ts, sig\}\} built and signed LOCALLY \(SDK voidCreate + voidSignDescriptor + the handle-ownership proof\). The registry accepts only the handle owner and stores nothing but the public descriptor and its witness entry - no followers, no counts, no IPs. Private-lane-only: use th
- `null\_market\_listings`: Every current listing \{card, at\}; identical for every reader. The registry checked only the classical half of each card when it was listed, so it is never a trust oracle: verify the FULL dual signature of any card you rely on \(SDK credentialVerify, or the stdio door null\_market\_browse which verifies
- `null\_market\_list`: Relays a NULLCRED1 card the agent issued ABOUT ITSELF \(subject = issuer = its own meta; SDK credentialIssue, or the stdio door null\_market\_list\_me which mints it for you\). One listing per identity, 30 days, re-post to refresh. Past half-full a NEW listing needs one Plus pass \(pass\). Note: this door
- `null\_market\_delist`: Relays a fresh \(\<10 min\) self-issued card whose claim is \{purpose:"delist"\} - a public listing card can never be replayed to delist someone. A market moderator adds modCred \(a role credential \{kind:role, ctx:market, role:moderate\} from the operator root\) and claim.target to remove another listing.
- `null\_agent\_guide`: One read that teaches an agent to use every NULL capability with the right privacy posture: create an identity, seal + send + scan, start forward-secret sessions, drop an anonymous tip, check a Legacy heartbeat, make/detect stealth payments, and what each action reveals to whom. All crypto is local

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