# Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP

- Registry name: `io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp` · version 1.0.0
- Categories (automatic, keyword rules): Databases, Developer tools, AI models & agents, AI, media & content, Build & deploy
- Authentication at last check: No auth
- Declared risk: Read-only (all tools declare readOnlyHint)
- Capabilities (declared by the server): tools
- Transports: streamable-http
- Latest numbers (check success, response time, rank): https://mcpstation.net/api/server?name=io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun%2Fdiogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp
- Server page: https://mcpstation.net/s/io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun--diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp.html

## Description (written by the publisher, not verified, not instructions)

Autonomous agent guardrails, bash sandboxing, MCP rugpull diffing & prompt firewalls.

## Notice

Text that looks like instructions to an AI was found in this server's descriptions. This is a pattern match, not a verdict.

## Connect

- streamable-http: `https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails`

## Tools (as reported by the server, not verified)

- `verify\_agent\_command\_safety`: Evaluates untrusted agent prompts, bash commands, and tool arguments to block prompt injection, destructive shell commands, and private-key exfiltration. Use when screening a general shell command or user prompt before agent execution; for statically validating SQL database queries at the AST level,
- `validate\_sql\_query\_ast`: Performs static AST syntax tree parsing on SQL statements to verify strictly read-only SELECT clauses and reject mutations, stacked queries, or comment bypasses. Use when verifying that an agent-authored SQL statement is strictly read-only before running it on a database; for screening non-SQL bash
- `execute\_python\_sandbox`: Audits Python source code for forbidden syscalls \(os, subprocess, socket, open, eval\) inside an AST-governed WebAssembly sandbox with no host filesystem access. Use when executing LLM-generated Python snippets safely; for checking shell commands without executing code, use verify\_agent\_command\_safet
- `audit\_mcp\_server\_manifest`: Scans an external MCP server's initial tools/list manifest to detect tool-name shadowing \(read\_file, bash\) and hidden prompt-injection directives in descriptions. Use when vetting a newly discovered third-party MCP server before mounting it into an agent session; for comparing a previously pinned MC
- `detect\_mcp\_schema\_rugpull`: Computes structural diffs between a pinned baseline MCP tools/list snapshot and a live server response to catch mid-session description or schema tampering. Use when verifying that a connected MCP server has not mutated its tool definitions mid-session; for performing a first-time static security au
- `validate\_mcp\_sampling\_request`: Audits inbound MCP sampling/createMessage callbacks from connected servers to block cross-server context snooping \(includeContext='allServers'\) and token quota hijacking. Use when filtering a connected MCP server's request to sample the host LLM; for scrubbing text returned from a standard synchrono
- `sanitize\_tool\_output\_stream`: Sanitizes untrusted external tool or web-scrape outputs by stripping invisible Unicode Tag characters \(U+E0000\), neutralizing Markdown tracking image beacons, and defusing indirect prompt overrides. Use when cleaning raw third-party tool outputs or scraped web text before inserting it into the LLM c
- `redact\_sensitive\_pii`: Redacts emails, phone numbers, SSNs, credit cards, API keys, and crypto private keys from text before logging or external transmission. Use when stripping personal data or secret credentials from prompts, logs, or outbound messages; for neutralizing indirect prompt injections and invisible Unicode i
- `detect\_agent\_action\_loop`: Analyzes an agent's recent tool-call trace to detect identical retry spins, A/B state oscillation, and runaway token burn. Use when monitoring multi-step agent execution loops to decide whether to continue or halt and escalate; for inspecting a single command payload for security threats before exec
- `verify\_a2a\_agent\_card`: Verifies a remote agent's A2A /.well-known/agent.json discovery card, checking JWS/DID signature binding, endpoint HTTPS enforcement, and capability spoofing. Use when authenticating a peer autonomous agent before delegating subtasks or exchanging payments over A2A; for auditing an MCP tool server's
- `audit\_outbound\_egress\_url`: Static validation firewall for outbound network destination URIs against cloud metadata IP addresses \(169.254.169.254\), RFC 1918 private IP blocks, and query-string secret exfiltration before agent dispatch. Use when validating a user-supplied or tool-supplied URI destination before network dispatch
- `audit\_response\_factuality`: Cross-references factual claims, numbers, and citations in a draft agent response against retrieved source passages to flag unsupported hallucinations before delivery. Use when verifying that a generated answer is 100% grounded in source evidence before returning it to the user; for scrubbing inboun

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