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Moltline Agent Governance
com.moltlinestudio/govern · v1.2.0
Instruction-like text in descriptions
Measured by MCP Station
| Last check | Reachable |
|---|---|
| Checked at | — |
| Check success 7 / 30 days | — |
| First-try success 30 days | — |
| Median response | — |
| Lookups 30 days | — |
| Authentication | No auth |
| MCP version | 2025-06-18 |
| Rank score | — |
| Declared risk | Read-only (all tools declare readOnlyHint) |
| Capabilities declared | experimental, extensions, logging, prompts, resources, tools |
| Tool definitions | 8 tools · with description 100% · input schema is an object 100% · read/destructive hints 100% |
Instruction-like text was found in audit_skill_file, get_auditor_persona, injection_scan. This is a pattern match, not a verdict. What we look for
Description written by the publisher, not verified
Audit MCP configs and skill files for over-broad scope and injection risk. 6 of 8 free.
Connect
streamable-http · https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern
claude mcp add --transport http govern https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern{
"mcpServers": {
"govern": {
"url": "https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern"
}
}
}Tools as reported by the server
audit_mcp_configAudit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, and dangerous auto-run flags. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"confiscope_checkScore the blast radius of every tool in a permission manifest. FREE. Ranks each tool by capability risk (command exec > money/delete > file-write/messaging > read > network) and flags the over-privileged ones that need approval gates. Typical input {"tools": "[\"run_shell\", \"read_docs\"]"} returnsaudit_skill_fileAudit an agent skill or instruction file before you trust it. FREE. Checks for governance smells: prompt-injection and guardrail-bypass phrasing, concealment instructions ('don't tell the user'), exfiltration language, and exposed credential material. Typical input {"content": "<SKILL.md, system proinjection_scanScan untrusted text for prompt-injection patterns before ingestion. FREE. Use on any web page, email, or document an agent is about to ingest to catch prompt-injection and data-exfiltration patterns before they reach the agent's context. Typical input {"text": "<untrusted content>"} returns {"injectinventory_reportBuild a governance inventory with risk tiers from a raw agent list. FREE. Turns a list of agents / MCP servers / skills into an audit-ready summary with critical/elevated/standard tiers and unowned-agent flags. Typical input {"items": "[{\"name\": \"deploy-bot\", \"owner\": \"ana\"}]"} returns {"totgovernance_policyGenerate an audit-ready agent-governance policy for a fleet. PREMIUM (license). Covers inventory cadence, ownership rules, least-privilege approval gates, injection defense, logging/retention, and decommissioning triggers. Typical input {"fleet_context": "20 agents, 3 with shell access, one financeget_auditor_personaLoad the Governance Auditor persona for consistent fleet audits. PREMIUM (license). The persona is methodical, evidence-driven, and allergic to 'it's probably fine'. Takes no arguments. Returns {"persona": ..., "identity": ..., "rules": ["...", ...], "opening_move": "..."} ready to adopt as a systemagent_readiness_scanScore a public domain against 21 agent-readiness checks. FREE. Use when you need to know whether an autonomous agent can discover, read, use or pay a website - your own, or a vendor you are evaluating before recommending it. Typical input {"domain": "example.com"} returns {"score": 8, "total": 21, "
Repository · Website · JSON · Text for agents · Registry updated 2026-09-08