All servers · Payments & accounting · Crypto & blockchain
com.oceanalt/aml
com.oceanalt/aml · v0.7.6
New (7 days)Tools changed (7 days)
Measured by MCP Station
| Last check | Reachable |
|---|---|
| Checked at | — |
| Check success 7 / 30 days | — |
| First-try success 30 days | — |
| Median response | — |
| Lookups 30 days | — |
| Authentication | No auth |
| MCP version | 2025-06-18 |
| Rank score | — |
| Declared risk | Can write (some tools are not declared read-only) |
| Capabilities declared | prompts, resources, tools |
| Tool definitions | 13 tools · with description 100% · input schema is an object 100% · read/destructive hints 100% |
Description written by the publisher, not verified
Pre-payment checks for AI agents: sanctions and AML screening of payees, payment pages and requests.
Connect
streamable-http · https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http aml https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp{
"mcpServers": {
"aml": {
"url": "https://oceanalt.com/api/mcp"
}
}
}Tools as reported by the server
payment_decisionCall this before every payment your agent makes. Free, no signup, no API key. To see it work first, call it with {"to":"0xd90e2f925DA726b50C4Ed8D0Fb90Ad053324F31b","network":"ethereum"}: that address is a known mixer, so the answer is decline with the matching list as evidence. Pass the payee addresscreen_addressRun an AML compliance screen on a single blockchain address BEFORE paying or receiving from it — the pre-payment check on a counterparty. Checks OFAC sanctions, known mixers, scam and phishing lists, stablecoin issuer freezes, and on-chain heuristics. Returns a verdict (clear | caution | risky), a 0screen_endpointScreen a payment ENDPOINT (URL or domain) before calling it — the half that address screening cannot answer. In x402 the agent discovers a URL first, receives a 402, and only then learns where to pay: if that endpoint is spoofed, the payee address it hands back is freshly generated and appears on nocheck_payment_requestCall this before paying because an email, invoice or chat message asked you to. Pass what you received: raw headers if you have them, the From line, subject and body (or body_html), and the payee address if you already extracted one. OceanAlt checks whether the sender is who it claims to be (SPF/DKIcounterparty_control_baselineAnswers a different question from address screening. Screening asks whether an address is risky; this asks how much damage the agent on the other side could do if it were talked into something. Returns that party's self-attestation against the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline, split into two sets thaattest_control_baselineFile your operator's control-baseline attestation — the counterpart to counterparty_control_baseline. That tool asks what controls the OTHER side runs; this one publishes what YOUR side runs, so payers can see it before settling with you. No account, no key, one call. Gaps are allowed and expected:baseline_controlsFetch the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline: the list of controls an agent operator is expected to run before it is allowed to move money, each answerable yes or no. Call this before attest_control_baseline so you file against real control ids. Each control carries which gate enforces it and why it exresolve_agent_identityResolves who stands behind a paying agent: agent -> principal -> mandate -> credential -> wallet. Each link reports whether it holds; completeness counts how many do (a factual count, not a score). Wherever the chain breaks is where accountability stops. Publication is opt-in and only posture is exprecent_flaggedReturn a representative sample of addresses on OceanAlt's reviewed risk list — OFAC-sanctioned, known mixers, and scam/phishing — each with its source category and reason. Takes no arguments. Free, no API key.verify_payment_requirementsBefore paying an x402 402 response, check that its payment requirements (payTo, amount, asset, network, resource) were signed by the seller and not altered in transit by a proxy, CDN, SDK or another tool. x402 v2 carries the requirements in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED response header (base64 JSON): pass eicheck_calldata_intentAnti blind-signing. EVM: decodes what a transaction's calldata will actually do (ERC-20 transfer/approve/permit, setApprovalForAll, ownership transfer, native transfer). Solana: decodes a whole base64 transaction (SPL Token / Token-2022 Transfer, TransferChecked, Approve, SetAuthority, CloseAccount,payee_decideThe receiving side's check before settlement. Given the payee's registry id (sid) and, optionally, the payer, amount and purpose, returns accept / decline / hold_request_info / not_ready with reason codes, the fields to request, evidence and a signature. Rule-based, not a model's opinion. Same logicevidence_bundleEverything OceanAlt holds about an address as public facts, in one Ed25519-signed bundle you can verify offline: screening verdict with evidence and freshness, profile signals, one-hop relations to listed addresses, fulfillment receipt stats and coverage. A witness, not a prosecutor: no conclusions
Tool changes
- 2026-10-20: payment_decision, screen_address, screen_endpoint, check_payment_request, counterparty_control_baseline, attest_control_baseline, baseline_controls, resolve_agent_identity, recent_flagged, verify_payment_requirements, check_calldata_intent, payee_decide
- 2026-10-18: payment_decision, screen_address, screen_endpoint, check_payment_request, counterparty_control_baseline, attest_control_baseline, baseline_controls, resolve_agent_identity, recent_flagged, verify_payment_requirements, check_calldata_intent, payee_decide
- 2026-10-16: payment_decision, screen_address, screen_endpoint, counterparty_control_baseline, attest_control_baseline, baseline_controls, resolve_agent_identity, recent_flagged, verify_payment_requirements, check_calldata_intent, payee_decide, evidence_bundle
Repository · Website · JSON · Text for agents · Registry updated 2026-10-20