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Trust Gate
io.github.CWNApps/trust-gate-mcp · v0.2.0
No registry update 90+ days
Measured by MCP Station
| Last check | Reachable |
|---|---|
| Checked at | — |
| Check success 7 / 30 days | — |
| First-try success 30 days | — |
| Median response | — |
| Lookups 30 days | — |
| Authentication | No auth |
| MCP version | 2025-06-18 |
| Rank score | — |
| Declared risk | Not declared (tools carry no read/destructive hints) |
| Capabilities declared | experimental, prompts, resources, tools |
| Tool definitions | 7 tools · with description 100% · input schema is an object 100% · read/destructive hints 0% |
Description written by the publisher, not verified
Post-quantum, tamper-evident receipts for agent actions. Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, offline verify.
Connect
streamable-http · https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http trust-gate-mcp https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp{
"mcpServers": {
"trust-gate-mcp": {
"url": "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp"
}
}
}Tools as reported by the server
mint_receipt_for_record_changeMint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for one CRM record change. Old/new values are carried as SHA-256 hashes. Works with any CRM (Relaticle, hosted CRMs, custom).audit_my_agent_inventoryRank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act (a name-based heuristic that weights a name's first word most). Read-only: it mints no receipt. Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in.mint_action_receiptMint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for an arbitrary consequential agent action. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type (human/agent/script), triggered_by_source (api/cli/cron), decision_model (the LLM model used). Attestation values are callerverify_receiptVerify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline). ok=true means unchanged since signing, signed, kid consistent with the embedded key, and (require_pq default on) at least one post-quantum leg verified; unsigned receipts fail. It does not prove who signed: pass expected_kid to pin thgate_decisionTwo-phase decision gate with a real verdict. PREVIEW returns ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE with the risk tier and reasons, plus a preview_id, without acting. COMMIT re-evaluates the same inputs and mints a signed receipt for the verdict. Only ALLOW returns a GRANTED permit; DENY returns DENIED; ESCALATE rcheck_egressEgress classification check. Scans a data sample for a finite list of sensitivity markers and classifies as NO_MARKERS_FOUND / INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL / RESTRICTED. RESTRICTED sets blocked=true; this tool cannot block anything itself, and NO_MARKERS_FOUND is not clearance to send. Returns classificarun_exit_drillVendor exit readiness drill. Checks local signing key, local model access (Ollama). Returns step-by-step results and a tamper-evident receipt. Informational; it signs one receipt, which creates the signing key on a host that has none yet.
Repository · Website · JSON · Text for agents · Registry updated 2026-06-25