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GlyphGuard
dev.workers.mike-tusa.glyphguard/glyphguard · v0.1.0
New (7 days)
Measured by MCP Station
| Last check | Reachable |
|---|---|
| Checked at | — |
| Check success 7 / 30 days | — |
| First-try success 30 days | — |
| Median response | — |
| Lookups 30 days | — |
| Authentication | No auth |
| MCP version | 2025-06-18 |
| Rank score | — |
| Declared risk | Read-only (all tools declare readOnlyHint) |
| Capabilities declared | tools |
| Tool definitions | 3 tools · with description 100% · input schema is an object 100% · read/destructive hints 100% |
Description written by the publisher, not verified
Find hidden Unicode (zero-width, bidi, tag payloads), homoglyphs and lookalike names in text.
Connect
streamable-http · https://glyphguard.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http glyphguard https://glyphguard.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp{
"mcpServers": {
"glyphguard": {
"url": "https://glyphguard.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
}Tools as reported by the server
scan_textFind invisible characters, bidi controls (Trojan Source), hidden Unicode tag payloads (decoded), variation-selector runs, control characters, unusual spaces, mixed-script words and lookalike letters. ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 in legitimate context (emoji sequences, Persian/Arabic joining, Indic virama) are repoclean_textReturn the text with invisible characters, bidi controls, tag characters and control characters removed and unusual spaces turned into normal spaces. By default ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 are kept inside emoji sequences, between letters of joining scripts (Arabic, Persian) and after an Indic virama (keep_joinerscompare_namesCheck whether a name, username, domain label or brand looks the same as any of up to 50 protected names (for example "pаypal" with a Cyrillic а vs "paypal"), using a UTS #39-style confusable skeleton (curated subset, case and accents ignored). Read-only. Same engine as GET /api/compare.
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