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SmuggleCheck
dev.workers.mike-tusa.smugglecheck/smugglecheck · v0.1.2
New (7 days)Instruction-like text in descriptions
Measured by MCP Station
| Last check | Reachable |
|---|---|
| Checked at | — |
| Check success 7 / 30 days | — |
| First-try success 30 days | — |
| Median response | — |
| Lookups 30 days | — |
| Authentication | No auth |
| MCP version | 2025-06-18 |
| Rank score | — |
| Declared risk | Read-only (all tools declare readOnlyHint) |
| Capabilities declared | tools |
| Tool definitions | 2 tools · with description 100% · input schema is an object 100% · read/destructive hints 100% |
Instruction-like text was found in scan_text. This is a pattern match, not a verdict. What we look for
Description written by the publisher, not verified
Find hidden prompt-injection text: ASCII smuggling, zero-width/emoji stego, bidi, homoglyphs.
Connect
streamable-http · https://smugglecheck.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http smugglecheck https://smugglecheck.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp{
"mcpServers": {
"smugglecheck": {
"url": "https://smugglecheck.mike-tusa.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
}Tools as reported by the server
scan_textScan untrusted text for prompt-injection smuggling and deceptive Unicode before it reaches a model or a reader. Detects Unicode tag characters ("ASCII smuggling", decodes the hidden text), zero-width characters (incl. binary stego decode), variation-selector stego ("emoji smuggling", decodes the paycompare_stringsCompare two strings (usernames, domains, brand or command names) with Unicode UTS #39 skeletons and say whether they can look the same to a reader: identical, confusable, confusable_ignoring_case or distinct. Also returns each string's scripts, whether it mixes scripts, and its skeleton. Up to 1024
Website · JSON · Text for agents · Registry updated 2026-10-18